Are Medicaid patients being subsidized by other residents in nursing homes? This article employs cross-sectional data on nursing homes and residents in a multiproduct empirical cost analysis to obtain the benchmark magnitudes of patient service costs needed to assess the issues. The estimated cost function provides evidence that Medicaid reimbursement rates are lower than the average incremental cost of care for Medicaid patients in approximately one quarter to one third of Florida nursing homes. One possible explanation for this apparent cross-subsidization, considered here, is that patients pay a premium in self-insured rates early in their residency to fairly cover the expected future losses if they later convert to Medicaid. Based on the empirical frequencies of patient transitions to different payer status over the length of the nursing home stay, it is shown that the apparent cross-subsidization is explained, to a large extent, by an intertemporal conversion surcharge.
Introduction
Nursing home owners have long insisted that the Medicaid program does not reimburse them enough to cover the costs of providing care to Medicaid patients, but it is not clear that nursing homes are actually losing money on Medicaid residents (Ettner 1993 ). Using standard profit-maximization models of firm behavior, Morrisey (1994) has critically considered the potential for cross-subsidization by health service providers and has concluded that such behavior is unlikely. Using empirical methods, several authors have explored the possibility of crosssubsidization in the hospital industry. For example, Dranove (1988) determined that Illinois hospitals cost shifted in response to substantial reductions in Medicaid payments in the early 1980s. In contrast, Hadley, Zuckerman, and Iezzoni (1996), Dor and Farley (1996) , and Dranove and White (1998) found no evidence of hospital cost shifting. However, a lack of cross-subsidization in the hospital industry does not necessarily imply a lack of cross-subsidization in the nursing home industry, where residents not funded by the government are unorganized and generally pay out-of-pocket for care.
Despite the mounting evidence against cost shifting in hospitals, there are at least two possible explanations for findings of cross-subsidization in the nursing home industry that are consistent with economic theory. First, industry regulators may be granting favors to nursing home providers in exchange for the provision of unprofitable nursing home days for govern-ment-funded patients (Posner 1971) . For example, Certificate-of-Need (CON) regulators may be doling out rewards in the form of scarce CON licenses to nursing homes that provide unremunerative care for Medicaid patients (Fourier and Campbell 1997). Alternatively, regulators may protect firms that take on additional Medicaid residents by restricting the bed supply in the market, providing market power for an existing firm. Applications for new beds in Florida may include a mix of beds set aside for Medicaid patients and beds open to any patient type. Thus, a CON approval would give the nursing home more beds overall, where the nursing home applying for the CON anticipates the ability to profit from the application if approved, while a CON denial for a competitor would enforce the market power of existing homes.
Second, there may be considerable uncertainty with respect to whether a nursing home resident is going to convert to Medicaid. Thus, nursing homes may accept a self-pay or Medicare patient without certainty about how the individual's care will be funded for the duration of his/ her stay. Legally, nursing homes may face an explicit responsibility to continue to provide unremunerative services to a resident that converts to Medicaid after entering the nursing home. As a hedge against this obligation, the nursing home may impose a surcharge on all self-pay residents to compensate for the risk of conversion to Medicaid. Ex ante, nursing homes do not know with certainty which patients will spend-down to Medicaid. Thus, nursing homes may charge self-pay patients an actuarially fair high price to account for the risk of conversion in future periods. In other words, self-pay patients may be forced to pay an intertemporal conversion surcharge to compensate firms for the risk of conversion to Medicaid. Common knowledge about the risk of conversion would be factored into a determination of the full cost price.
The possibility of a surcharge for intertemporal conversions coupled with the reality of relatively low Medicaid reimbursement rates in Florida nursing homes leads to two questions that will be addressed sequentially in this article. First, are Medicaid reimbursement rates in Florida adequate to cover the incremental cost of care provided to Medicaid residents? If not, is the risk of conversion substantial enough to explain the rate differential among payer types? If the price paid for Medicaid patients does not cover the costs of care for Medicaid patients, a case may be made for cross-subsidization in the cross-section examined. Given the transition of some individuals from self-pay or Medicare to Medicaid over time, an additional examination of the rate structure of apparently cross-subsidizing homes is warranted. If the average revenue for patients not on Medicaid upon admission offsets realized future postconversion losses on average in every nursing home, the intertemporal conversion surcharge explains differences in prices across payer types entirely. If instead the expected net revenue for patients not on Medicaid upon admission is nonzero, there remains a portion of the rate structure that could be construed as cross-subsidization.
Investigation of these issues requires a carefully designed empirical cost analysis. While Little (1992) examined cost shifting in nursing homes using aggregate data, there have been no other studies of cross-subsidization in nursing homes and there have been no studies of crosssubsidization using facility-and resident-level data. Using firm-level and resident-level data from Florida, this article will present estimates of the incremental cost of treating different patient groups and will examine the risk of conversion. The article will begin in section 2 with a discussion of important characteristics of the Florida nursing home industry, followed by section 3 with a discussion of the hypotheses and methods used in the analysis. Section 4 contains the empirical estimates, followed by a concluding section that examines the public policy implications of the results. In nursing homes today, there are three major payer types: private pay, Medicaid funded, and Medicare funded. Private-pay (i.e., self-pay) residents or their families pay for nursing home expenses without any government assistance. The Medicaid program covers long-term care for the poor, subject to the eligibility standards established by the state. Under the Medicaid program in Florida, for example, a nursing home is reimbursed at a prospective rate per day for each Medicaid-funded resident. Over the period examined in this study, in Florida, nursing homes are paid the same daily reimbursement rate for each Medicaid-funded resident per day, regardless of the disability level of the resident.
The third major payer for nursing home care is the Medicare program, a federal program that funds medical care for the elderly and pays for convalescent or terminal, not long-term, nursing home care. Medicare nursing home coverage is currently limited to 100 days, and it requires prior hospitalization and a physician-established need for skilled nursing services. In the period before 1998 considered in this study, nursing homes submitted cost reports to the Medicare program and they were reimbursed for all covered costs. While Medicare pays for all care for the first 20 days of a qualifying nursing home stay, it requires a copayment, which is generally paid with private or Medicaid dollars. In 1996, the Medicare per diem copayment for days 21-100 of a nursing home stay was $78.50.
In Florida, the proportion of 1996 nursing home revenues obtained from private-pay nursing home residents (25%) was approximately equal to the proportion of all nursing home days utilized by private-pay residents (22%). In contrast, the proportion of revenue from Medicaid residents (41%) was less than their proportionate presence in the nursing home (58%), and Medicare revenues (34%) exceeded Medicare's proportionate share of residents (20%). For the first half of 1997, the statewide average Medicaid reimbursement rate was $93.16. The highest rate paid to any facility during this period was $141.76, and the lowest rate paid to any facility was $66.83. In contrast, in 1996, the average reported daily rate paid by privatepay residents was $126.87 for a semiprivate room, and the mean revenue per patient day from Medicare-funded residents was $371.82. Since Medicare patient care is reimbursed on a cost basis per patient, a Medicare reimbursement rate is not available. Medicare revenue per patient per day, while not equivalent to such a rate, may arguably serve as a reasonable proxy.
Risk of Conversion to Medicaid
The rate differentials outlined in the previous discussion are likely to make Medicaid residents less desirable than other patients in markets with excess demand. State and federal laws have long existed to protect people from being evicted when they convert to Medicaid. The exception to this statement are nursing homes that refuse to participate in the Medicaid program entirely or fail to obey the law. In Florida in 1997, approximately 11% of all facilities were not certified to accept Medicaid patients. Regulations state that residents can only be forced to leave under specific circumstances: when the facility cannot meet the resident's needs, when the resident is in danger, when the resident poses a threat to other residents, when the resident is well enough to leave the home, or when the resident has failed to pay for nursing home services. In addition, residents facing a discharge must be given a written notice 30 days in advance of the discharge, where the notice must contain information about how to file an appeal. 
Cross-Subsidization Versus Intertemporal Conversion Surcharge
The presence of the risk of conversion and inadequate Medicaid reimbursement rates means that the profit-maximizing nursing home charges a higher rate to self-paying residents to compensate the home for the expected future cost of residents who convert to Medicaid in some future period. In an intertemporal sense, self-pay residents pay a premium associated with the risk of conversion; if actuarially fair, the rate structure will fully reflect the expected cost to the nursing home of conversion to Medicaid. An intertemporal surcharge of this sort is not identical to the traditional definition of cross-subsidization among patients, where cross-subsidization imposes a burden on one group of payers to cover the expenses of another group of payers (Sloan and Becker 1984) . While reductions in Medicaid payment rates will increase the risk to the nursing home of conversions and cause an increase in the surcharge paid by self-pay residents, the premium increase may be actuarially fair and economically efficient. In contrast, the static cross-subsidization story is inconsistent with economic theory. Under standard profitmaximization conditions, a firm that sells health care services to two groups of patients will not raise the price of care to one group of patients in response to a price cut from the second group of patients because doing so would drive profitable patients to other lower-priced nursing homes (Morrisey 1994 ).
Assuming a nursing home accepts only Medicaid and self-pay residents, a stay for an individual entering the home as self-pay may be divided into two time periods: the date of entry of a self-pay resident into the nursing home and the subsequent stay of that resident who may convert to Medicaid. When there is a positive probability of conversion (0 < p < 1), the optimal preconversion price to self-pay patients (Pp) is a negative function of the exogenously determined Medicaid reimbursement rate (PMD)' In period 1, nursing home residents enter the nursing home as self-pay patients, and revenue from self-pay patients is XpPp. In period 2, given the legally enforceable obligation not to dump Medicaid residents, expected revenues from individuals identified as self-pay in period 1 are E(revenuep) = P(PMDXP) + (1 -)(PPXP).
(1) Ignoring discounting, the profit-maximizing nursing home's objective function over both periods is max(Tr) = (rri) + P(1f2) + (1 
The optimal price to self-pay residents upon admission, Pp*, depends on (PMD -CMD), that is, the price depends on the degree to which the regulated reimbursement rate after conversion fails to cover the costs of care for these patients. Indeed,
The bigger the deficit, the higher the price charged to entering self-pay patients, that is, the higher the intertemporal conversion surcharge to self-pay residents. 
Cross-Subsidization

Hypotheses and Methods
Cost Function Estimation
The issue of cross-subsidization has been examined from the perspective of costs in the literature concerned with natural monopoly regulation. Like public utilities, nursing homes may be modeled as multiproduct firms, with outputs denominated in nursing home beds per payer type per day. Economists have formulated two tests for cross-subsidization: the average incremental cost test and the stand-alone test (Braeutigam 1989 
Cross-subsidization exists if the price of XMD is less than the average incremental cost of producing XMD. The incremental cost test establishes a lower bound on the revenues that must be generated by production of Medicaid patient days to deem the production subsidy free. In contrast, the stand-alone test sets an upper bound on the revenues generated by producing private-pay resident days; if the revenues generated by production of private-pay resident days exceed the costs of providing only private-pay resident days, then proceeds from production of the private-pay resident days are being used to subsidize the production of other goods. Mathematically,
where C(Xp, 0, 0) is the cost of producing only private-pay resident days, Xp is the number of private-pay resident days produced, and Pp is the daily rate paid by private-pay residents. In words, the costs of producing only private-pay patient days must be greater than or equal to the revenue from private-pay residents if private-pay residents are to avoid cross-subsidizing other resident types. If the revenue were greater than the cost, then investors would benefit from the existence of a new firm that only produces private-pay resident days. The total costs of an individual nursing home are a function of outputs (measured by resident days), of relative input prices, and of a vector of control variables. The model contains three outputs: Medicaid patient days, Medicare patient days, and private-pay patient days, where private-pay patient days include days funded by other means. The choice of three outputs is driven by general differences across patients that cause them to qualify (or fail to qualify) for a specific type of reimbursement program. For example, Medicare coverage requires that the patient be hospitalized for at least three days prior to entering the nursing home, that the patient be admitted to the nursing home within 30 days of the hospital discharge, and that a medical doctor certify that skilled nursing is required. Thus, Medicare pays primarily for rehabilitative nursing home care. In contrast, Medicaid residents must meet certain asset and income tests, which may occur for a portion of residents after a long period of illness or institutionalization.
The model also contains four input prices: labor (including nursing services), property, patient care services (less nursing services), and other inputs. The relative prices of the first three inputs are measured by the following price indices: a hospital wage index for the metropolitan statistical area (MSA), a housing price index by county, and a general price index by county. Because of unavailability of data on the price of other inputs, the conventional assumption that these prices are uniform across the nursing homes in the sample is employed. Through this assumption, the price of other inputs serves as a numeraire in imposing the input homogeneity restrictions. 
Empirical Estimates
Cost-Based Tests for Cross-Subsidization
As discussed above, the issue of cross-subsidization may be examined from the perspective of costs using the average incremental cost test and the stand-alone test. To test for subsidization of Medicaid residents by residents funded through other means and to test for the ability of self-pay residents to subsidize such care, a joint-production cost function, C(XMD, Xp, XMR), is estimated. The cost function may be evaluated at zero production of Medicaid patients to find C(O, Xp, XMR) or at zero production of Medicaid and Medicare patients to find
C(O, , , 0).
While eight cost-function specifications were specified to allow for estimates using two measures of case mix and combinations of three measures of quality, the direction and magnitude of the relationships are consistent across measures of case mix and quality. Thus, only three specifications are reported in Table 3 , where each specification involves different measures of quality: Column 1 includes only inspection deficiencies, column 2 includes inspection deficiencies and registered nurse hours per patient day, and column 3 includes inspection deficiencies and all nurse labor hours per patient day.
The cost-function estimates, found in Table 3 Moreover, nonprofit and government-owned nursing homes have higher costs than forprofit homes, where the costs are higher for government-owned than nonprofit facilities. However, the costs of for-profit and nonprofit homes may be fundamentally different. When evaluated at the sample means, nonprofit firms are predicted to have costs that are 29.9% higher than forprofit firms. However, 21.4% of the 29.9% differential may be explained by differences in the measured characteristics of nonprofit and for-profit facilities. In other words, most of the cost difference between for-profit and nonprofit entities may be explained by differences in size, patient populations, and levels of service. In terms of quality, an increase in the number of inspection-related deficiencies per patient is associated with lower costs and an increase in the number of nurse hours per patient is associated with higher costs. In other words, higher quality implies higher costs. Mean scaling also allows for ease in interpretation of some of the coefficients. For example, the coefficient for each output represents the elasticity of that output with respect to costs at the sample mean value of the variable. As expected, the production of private-pay patient days is more sensitive to changes in costs than the production of Medicaid and Medicare days. This is due to the fact that changes in factor costs can most easily be passed along to Medicare and Medicaid residents, who do not pay out of pocket for nursing home care.
Given the estimates, the average incremental cost per day of a Medicaid patient in a nursing home with mean characteristics (1996 dollars) is $29.39 to $67.66, where the range is a result of considering each of the eight cost functions specified. Using the first specification in Table 3 , the estimated average incremental cost per Medicaid patient day for individual facilities ranges from approximately $10 to $345. Controlling for facility-level case mix and quality and using the first specification in Table 3 , the estimated marginal cost of Medicaid care for a home with average characteristics is $45.48. In contrast, the estimated marginal cost of private care is $56.95. The difference between these values is statistically significant, with a t-test statistic equal to 8.654. Thus, at the margin, Medicaid residents are less costly than private-pay residents, which explains some of the observed differences in daily rates among payer types. When examining the predicted AIC for each facility, it is apparent that, in approximately one third to one half of nursing homes, the facility's Medicaid reimbursement rate is less than the average incremental cost of providing nursing home care to Medicaid patients. An alternative method of obtaining the AIC is to estimate the cost function using a smaller sample of nursing homes with no Medicaid residents. Using the coefficient estimates from the no-Medicaid sample and mean values for the right-hand-side variables from the entire sample, 29-30% of all nursing homes were found to be cross-subsidizers. To take advantage of the full sample, the subsequent analysis involves estimates using all nursing homes in the sample.
Correspondingly, approximately 17% of all firms fail the stand-alone test conducted for self-pay residents. In other words, nearly 17% of nursing homes obtain more revenue from selfpay residents than it costs them to produce only private-pay resident days. Thus, private-pay customers of these firms would be better off if they left the home and formed their own nursing home catering to only self-pay residents, as the newly created entity would have a daily rate that is less than what they are currently paying. While the predicted value of average incremental costs and stand-alone costs are point estimates subject to statistical error, they are suggestive of the true cost levels in the industry. Thus, there is evidence that cross-subsidization of Medicaid patients is taking place in some skilled nursing facilities, where private-pay residents in some facilities appear to be in a position to subsidize such care.4 Given that the model gives some questionable forecasts of AIC for self-pay residents in some nursing homes when using the full sample of nursing homes, apparent cross-subsidizing nursing homes for which the private-pay price is less than the average incremental cost of care for self-pay patients are identified and excluded from the cross-subsidizer sample. These nursing homes comprise approximately one third of the sample of the nursing homes found to be crosssubsidizers. As was noted by an anonymous referee, these may be failing firms. In 2000, 16.9% of all Florida nursing homes were in bankruptcy (Childs 2000) . When the remaining identified cross-subsidizers using the AIC test are considered, the proportion of nursing homes identified as cross-subsidizers drops to between 22 and 33% of all nursing homes.5
Given that some nursing homes have been identified as cross-subsidizers using the AIC test, one might wish to develop a profile of such homes. An examination of the mean characteristics of homes that appear to cross-subsidize is contained in Table 4 .6 Cross-subsidizing nursing homes have higher annual total costs than homes that do not cross-subsidize. In addition, cross-subsidizing homes have higher private-pay daily rates, are more likely to be located in urban areas, and are more likely to be for-profit and chain owned. They are also more likely to be located in markets with fewer beds per elderly capita, that is, cross-subsidizing homes are more likely to be in markets in which the bed supply is restricted by CON regulators. On average, nursing homes identified as cross-subsidizers are in markets with 28 beds per 1000 elderly capita, compared with 40 beds per 1000 elderly for nonsubsidizers. Thus, there is some evidence that nursing home owners subsidize care to Medicaid residents in exchange for regulatory favors.
level of output for Medicaid residents only. In contrast, as shown in Equation 9, the stand-alone cost estimate requires that the function be estimated at zero level of output for Medicaid and Medicare residents. Thus, the AIC test is used to identify cross-subsidizing firms. 5 The identity of cross-subsiders depends jointly on point estimates of AIC from the model. To check the robustness of these AIC estimates, the model was bootstrapped, using 100 random samples with replacement from the full sample, and from each one, an estimate of AIC was obtained. In sum, the results are robust to modifications in the criteria used to identify cross-subsidizing firms. These results are available from the author upon request.
Existence of an Intertemporal Conversion Surcharge
The finding of cross-subsidization using the static cost function estimates may not represent cross-subsidization across residents in nursing homes because it fails to address the potential for transitions to different payer types over the length of stay. Nursing home residents not entering the nursing home on Medicaid may undergo the following transitions: enter on Medicare and exit on Medicare; enter on Medicare and convert to Medicaid before exit; enter on Medicare and convert to self-pay before exit; enter on Medicare, convert to self-pay, and convert to Medicaid before exit; enter as self-pay and exit as self-pay; and enter as self-pay and convert to Medicaid before exit. The monetary impact of the risk of transition can be examined for a sample of nursing home resident stays (144,654) in nursing homes identified as cross-subsidizers.
As shown in Table 5 , 42.58% of residents that enter a cross-subsidizing nursing home on Medicare exit the nursing home within 20 days of admission. This is not surprising given that Medicare will only pay fully for the first 20 days of rehabilitative care following a three-day hospitalization. Therefore, individuals who might choose to take advantage of skilled nursing services during the period in which they are fully covered may not choose to remain in the nursing home when a fairly substantial copayment is required. In addition, only about 6% of individuals who enter a cross-subsidizing nursing home on Medicare ever convert to Medicaid. A similar proportion of self-pay residents eventually convert to Medicaid during their stay.
The present value estimates of net revenue may be calculated for each transition group. While most nursing home stays are of modest duration, some individuals do have lengthy stays. Thus, a conservative annual interest rate of 2% is used in the present value estimates.7 In addition, data on the length of time that it takes for patients that begin on Medicare to transition to self-pay are not available. Three alternative estimates of the duration of this transition period were used in the calculations: 20, 50, and 100 days. The results reveal that the use of different cutoffs affect only the magnitude, not the sign, of the present value estimates, so only the estimates assuming the conservative 20-day cutoff are contained in Table 5 .
In each case for each transition type, the present value of a resident's payment stream over the nursing home stay may be calculated given the average time spent in each payer category, the nursing home-specific reimbursement rate for each payer type, the nursing home-specific average incremental cost estimate for each payer type, and the interest rate. For the sake of this analysis, the self-pay reimbursement rate and estimated self-pay average incremental cost are used to calculate the net revenue per day for the Medicare portion of the nursing home stay.
In all three cases where the individual transitions to Medicaid during the nursing home stay, the average present value of the stream of payments is negative. Thus, in general, Medicaid-funded residents are not completely subsidizing their own costs of care through higher payment levels in the early days of the nursing home stay. However, the nursing home does appear to be adjusting the self-pay rate to account for the probability of transition, as evidenced by a positive present value for the net revenue stream for individuals who enter on Medicare or enter as self-pay. Indeed, less than 5% of all cross-subsidizing nursing homes have predicted net negative returns for patients who enter the nursing home on Medicare or as self-pay. To gain insight into the magnitude of the surcharge, one can examine the predicted net revenue and net losses from all patients entering the nursing home as self-pay or Medicare 
Conclusion
While some of the differences in payer daily rates may be explained by differences in the marginal cost of caring for self-pay and Medicaid patients, the incremental cost tests using cross-sectional data reveal that approximately one quarter to one third of Florida's nursing homes are subsidizing Medicaid residents. However, the conclusion of substantial cross-subsidization is somewhat misleading. When examining the subset of nursing homes identified using the average incremental cost tests, it is evident that those that convert to Medicaid probabilistically result in net losses for the average cross-subsidizing nursing home. In contrast, residents that enter the nursing home as self-pay or on Medicare are probabilistically net winners for crosssubsidizing nursing homes. Examination of the predicted net revenues for all patients entering the nursing home as self-pay or Medicare funded reveals that most nursing homes are compensating for the risk to the nursing home of conversions by charging a surcharge to all self-pay residents.
While the results reveal that cross-subsidization is not nearly as widespread as Florida nursing home owners claim, there is some evidence of cross-subsidization in the industry. Crosssubsidization is undesirable for several reasons. First, charging higher rates to private-pay residents may encourage middle-income people to shelter assets or hasten the transition of middleincome private-pay residents to Medicaid payer status. (See Norton (1995) and Taylor, Sloan, and Norton (1999) for more on the spend-down phenomenon.) The price distortions created by cross-subsidization may change the patterns of consumption in welfare-reducing ways, where 8 Given the negligible effect of discounting on the results contained in Table 5 , discounting is not used in the calculation of the values in Table 6 . The number of identified cross-subsidizers depends to some degree on the specification. All of the results presented after the cost functions are reported use the first specification in column 1 of Table 3 . Using the cost function specification that yielded the most cross-subsidizers (47% of all homes minus the ones for which the self-pay price is less than the AIC for self-pay residents), the transitions were reconsidered. There are small differences in the predicted revenue amounts, but the conclusions remain the same. Indeed, the legislation implementing prospective payment was projected to reduce Medicare reimbursements for nursing homes by about nearly $16 billion over five years (Giacalone 2001 ). In addition, there have been a number of high-profile bankruptcies in the industry in recent years. Nursing homes, which have been shown to cross-subsidize (or impose an intertemporal conversion surcharge) under less financially restrictive conditions, may increase such behavior or decrease quality levels. Both potential implications have been the focus of public concern in recent years, and the study findings reveal that nursing homes were already engaged, to some degree, in these activities in 1996, before prospective payment for Medicare. The shift of the Medicare program from cost-based to prospective payment for nursing home care may not bode well for self-pay nursing home residents if the federal government moves too far in the direction of restricting reimbursement rates. Currently, the burden of payment for Medicaid patients in nursing homes where the state underpays falls on the shoulders of all self-pay residents. While for many nursing homes the price to self-pay residents may be actuarially fair, it reflects a risk that would not be present if the Medicaid program raised reimbursement rates. Thus, this study provides a snapshot of the effect of low Medicaid reimbursement rates when coupled with a vigorous CON program before the change to prospective payment for Medicare-funded nursing home care.
